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BOOK REVIEW
OVERCOMING LAW. By Richard A. Posner." Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1995. Pp. 597. $40.
Reviewed by Michael B. Brennan*
This most recent monograph by the country's preeminent academic
judge is a book of and about legal theory. It issues a clarion call for an
empirical approach to law's dilemmas and defends liberal individualism.
It also raises troubling questions about the author's view of the role of a
judge under our constitutional framework and the relationship of social and
political theory to the business of judging.
In Overcoming Law, Richard Posner, the highly prolific and influential
scholar and chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, has summarized his systematic study of the law.
Renowned for his interdisciplinary approach in the law and economics'
and law and literature movements,2 Posner offers three keys to his
understanding of contemporary legal thought: pragmatism, economics, and
liberalism. To Posner, the fusion of these three elements can transform
legal theory: respect for social science and facts, coupled with belief in
individualism and a practical approach, "can make legal theory an effective
instrument for understanding and improving law, and social institutions
generally; for demonstrating the inadequacies of existing legal thought and
for putting something better in its place"(p. viii).'
Posner uses these three keys to analyze a myriad of topics and to
effectively summarize his synoptic view of the law. In addition to gathering
and extensively revising many of his articles and book reviews, he has
added six new essays (p. ix). Overcoming Law treats the length and
breadth of the legal world, from the raw economics of the profession of law
in its current state to its rarefied philosophical underpinnings. Posner's
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
The University of Chicago Law School.
* B.A., University of Notre Dame 1986; J.D., Northwestern University 1989. The
author wishes to thank James T. Barry III and Brian W. Blanchard for their helpful comments
and suggestions.
1. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (4th ed. 1992).
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (1988).
3. All parenthetical page references appearing in the text, and those appearing in the
notes without another identifying source, are to RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW
(1995).
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superior pedagogical skills, interdisciplinary approach, and knowledge of
the legal profession, as well as his readable writing style, make his
treatment of many of the topics examined in Overcoming Law a joy to
read. The book has six parts, each of which is comprised of four or five
chapters orbiting a common theme: the legal profession, constitutional
theory, variety and ideology in legal theory, gender and race, philosophical
and economic perspectives on law, and "cutting-edge" issues such as
personal privacy and the regulation of sexual behavior.
I. THE KEYS TO POSNER'S LEGAL THEORY
In the Introduction to Overcoming Law, Posner discusses in depth each
of the three keys he offers to understanding contemporary legal thought.
Posner returns to these keys throughout the book as touchstones for the
analytical and policy choices he makes.
For Posner, economics is a powerfully instrumental science that consists
of man basing decisions "on the costs to be incurred and the benefits to be
reaped from alternative courses of action" (p. 16). Rather than any
"narrow, selfish goal such as pecuniary wealth maximization," Posner
embraces an economic model of man as "rational maximizer" in which he
compares future opportunities at the moment when a choice must be made
(p. 16).
Posner operates from the premise that fact and theory are not opposed,
and that good social science, such as a nuanced understanding of economic
incentives and wealth maximization, can unite them (p. 19). Economics
"epitomizes the operation in law of the ethic of scientific inquiry" (p. 15).
Empirical research, and the theoretical framework economics provides for
that research, can make the law "more realistic, more attuned to the real
needs of real people" (p. 19).
Overcoming Law is unified by Posner's repeated call for scientific and
empirical analysis as the solution for intractable legal problems. Posner
calls for law to become "more empirical and less conceptual." His major
goal "is to nudge the judicial game a little closer to the science game" (p.
8). For Posner, the project of economics, which is "to construct and test
models of human behavior for the purpose of predicting, and [where
appropriate] controlling that behavior" (p. 16), will help to overcome the
shortcomings of classical legal theory. Pure deduction, for example, can
only compare the facts of a- contract case to a set rule derived from a priori
concepts. Economics can test the outcome of a case against empirical
criteria; if data proves the outcome to be incorrect, per science, the
applicable rule should be altered (p. 19).
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Posner admits that utilitarian and economic thinking can have "illiberal
implications," and that "[n]ot all questions that come up in law... can be
effortlessly recast as economic questions" (p. 22). When forced to take a
stand on issues of political and moral philosophy, Posner stands with the
liberalism espoused by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty: "every person is
entitled to the maximum liberty-both personal and economic-consistent
with the liberty of every other person in society" (p. 23). "Neither
government nor public opinion should seek to repress 'self-regarding'
behavior, that is, behavior that does not palpably harm other people" (pp.
23-24). Part of Posner's case for liberalism is its practical relation to
economics: "By creating a large sphere of inviolate private activity and by
facilitating the operation of free markets, liberalism creates the conditions
that experience teaches are necessary for personal liberty and economic
prosperity" (p. 24).
Posner also espouses a practical and instrumental philosophy that seeks
to determine what "really works" rather than what "really is." He terms
this philosophy pragmatism (p. 4). For Posner, pragmatism is forward-
looking; it values "continuity with the past only so far as such continuity
can help us cope with the problems of the present and of the future" (p.
4). Thus, applied to law, pragmatism would treat stare decisis as a policy
rather than a duty, as a generally governing principle instead of a
requirement (p. 4).
For Posner, the pragmatist is interested in facts and desires information
about the probable effects of alternative courses of action. At the same
time, the pragmatist is skeptical about certitudes or other "Truths" (p. 5).
Because he doubts that he will ever arrive at an ultimate Truth, the
pragmatist is anti-dogmatic: he desires to keep debate and inquiry open.
This skepticism manifests itself numerous times throughout the book.
Under this pragmatic approach to law, Posner promotes adherence to
precedent and "the immanent values of ... legal tradition" (p. 11), but
without obligation to do so. "[IMf there are good reasons to break with the
past for the sake of the present and the future the judge should not
hesitate to do so, just as mature sciences do not hesitate to forget their
founders" (pp. 11-12). To Posner, pragmatism is the opposite of the
formalistic, classical approach to legal theory, an approach that "is an
unworkable response to difficult cases" (p. 12). He continues by stating:
The multi-layered character of American law (legislation superim-
posed on common law, federal law superimposed on state law, and
federal constitutional law superimposed on state and federal
statutory and common law), the undisciplined character of our
legislatures, the intricacy and complexity of our society, and the
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moral heterogeneity of our population combine to thrust on the
courts a responsibility for creative lawmaking that cannot be
discharged either by applying existing rules to the letter or by
reasoning by analogy-the standard judicial technique for dealing
with novelty-from existing cases. (pp. 12-13)
For Posner, Holmes remains law's greatest embodiment of the pragmatic
philosophy towards law and judging.4
II. THE LEGAL WORLD ACCORDING TO POSNER
Posner's goal in Overcoming Law, with his three keys, is "to show that
liberal individualism can be defended pragmatically by comparing its
consequences with those likely to be produced by such alternatives as
social democracy and moral conservatism" (p. 29). He describes his
approach colorfully as "a taste for fact, a respect for social science, an
eclectic curiosity, a desire to be practical, a belief in individualism, and an
openness to new perspectives" (p. viii).
Posner taps a broad array of social, political, and legal sources to
analyze contemporary legal thought. Especially compelling are his
examinations of contemporary constitutional theorists (pp. 171-228),
including his devastating critiques of radical feminist jurisprudence and
critical race theory (pp. 329-84). On other occasions, the keys Posner
employs buckle under the strengths of other philosophies, judicial or
otherwise. Posner's analysis of the legal world under each of the three
keys is illustrative of his unique approach to legal theory.
A. Pragmatism and Constitutional Interpretation
Posner's pragmatic philosophy identifies with two leading American
jurists: Holmes and Hand. Judge Hand once ended a speech given on
Justice Holmes's ninety-first birthday with the admonition, "[H]ave no
confidence in principles that come to us in the trappings of the eternal.
Meet them with gentle irony, friendly skepticism and an open soul."5
Posner's legal philosophy echoes Hand's admonition, both as Posner relates
it in the Introduction to Overcoming Law and in his treatment of other
legal philosophies in the book.
4. This choice is further manifested in Posner's selection of Holmes for another recent
work: THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL
OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Richard A. Posner
ed., 1992).
5. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 433 (1994).
[hereinafter GUNTHER] (quoting LEARNED HAND, Democracy: Its Presumption and Realities,
in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 90, 101 (Irving Dillard ed., 3d ed. 1960)).
[Vol. 79:329
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One example of Posner's application of his pragmatic philosophy is his
treatment of certain contemporary styles of modem constitutional
theorizing. Posner rejects "top-down" legal reasoning, in which a theory
about an area of law is invented or adopted "and use[d] ... to organize,
criticize, accept or reject, explain or explain away, distinguish or amplify
the decided cases to make them conform to the theory and generate an
outcome in each new case as it arises that will be consistent with the theory
." (p. 172). To Posner, such thinking merely creates from a variety of
unprioritized sources a comprehensive theory of constitutional rights, with
the text given no particular primacy. The result is a submersion of textual
distinctions, and ultimately, a legal universe resting upon "a handful of
exemplary, often rather bodiless, cases" (p. 174).
Posner also rejects what he terms conventional, "bottom-up" legal
reasoning, which includes reasoning by analogy and interpretation by plain
meaning, in which a case or cases or a statute's words are the starting point
and reasoning is accomplished entirely by induction (pp. 172, 174-75).
Posner rejects this reasoning because of the inherent weaknesses of
inductive logic and its unjustifiable exclusion of "whole worlds of other
learning and insight" (p. 175).
Ultimately, Posner rejects as "imprudent, overambitious, excessively
contentious, and in the end too inconclusive the task of fashioning a
comprehensive theory of constitutional law" (p. 191). Instead, he does not
object to judges "stretching" clauses given "a compelling practical case or
imperative felt need for intervention" (p. 192). Posner looks to Holmes for
guidance on this approach: "The point is only that our deepest val-
ues-Holmes's 'can't helps'--live below thought and provide warrants for
action even when we cannot give those values a compelling or perhaps any
rational justification. This holds even for judicial action" (p. 192). Posner
thus locates a practical ground for judicial action in instinct rather than
analysis, as he says Holmes did (pp. 192, 195-96), in part because it "can
be a surer guide to action than analysis" (p. 194). Posner "accepts the role
of personal values in adjudication" while asking "only that they be yoked
to empirical data" (pp. 194-95).
Posner's skeptical view of constitutional theory exposes the faults in
judicial reasoning that wanders from the Constitution's text. It also suffers
from definitional and structural problems. It begs the question to limit
judicial "intervention" to "compelling" or "imperative" cases: how are
these to be determined, and by whom? The judiciary's role is constitution-
ally defined for specific political reasons, grounded in the separation of
powers of our democratic system. Posner makes no attempt to reconcile
a judge's "instinct" with this role. "Empirical data" can be used to support
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numerous positions or conclusions; Posner offers no "check" to balance a
judge's "instinctual" choice based on such data.
For example, Posner criticizes political scientist Walter Berns's
argument for two distinct spheres of law as being "too narrow." One
sphere is political, in which questions of the public good can be decided
legitimately only with the consent of the governed. The second is a
separate judicial sphere, in which judges find and apply the law, and
administer but do not create or alter private rights (pp. 229-36). Posner
asserts that society constantly presents to courts mixed questions of private
law and public policy, and that courts make "creative" decisions addressing
both spheres all the time (p. 231). For Posner, all interpolations by a court
cannot be usurpative (p. 231). Posner notes how the Framers allowed
substantial discretion to authoritative interpreters, as evidenced by the
generality of certain key constitutional clauses (p. 233). For Posner, "[a]
choice among semantically plausible interpretations of a text, in circum-
stances remote from those contemplated by its drafters, requires the
exercise of discretion and the weighing of consequences" (p. 233).
The judicial restraint and original interpretation Berns calls for,
however, is not the "too narrow" view of the law Posner ascribes to him.
No species of judicial restraint or originalism is so narrow as to preclude
the common law form of judging.6 Every court must render interstitial
decisions. Berns criticizes the importation of personal values to choose the
applicable rule of law, and would deny a court authority to choose the
principle itself He would not disallow the "creative" application of an
acknowledged principle.
That judges make "creative" decisions all the time begs the question.
The source of the rule of law in the "creating" is dispositive for Berns. He
would find no fault with interstitial reasoning, as his political philosophy
does not preclude historical common law decision-making. Berns's
difficulty is with judges who interpret policy decisions for themselves, or
who add a personal gloss to the legislature's policy judgment.' Berns
clearly draws the line between "interstitial application" and true "political"
issues by relying on the language and structure of the Constitution.8
Although he expresses dissatisfaction with this line, Posner offers no
principled rationale for a new one.
6. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 167-69 (1990).




Whether Posner's views on originalism are even well rooted in the
pragmatic philosophy he espouses may be questioned. Another famous
pragmatist whom Posner invokes, Hand (pp. 142, 438), takes a view closer
to Berns's on this issue. Upon his retirement from active service as a
federal appellate judge, Hand, in identifying the essential qualities for
judging, emphasized the necessity of "complete personal detachment ....
[A]s far as it is possible.., you must keep your personal choice out of the
frame you select to impose upon the written words."9 Hand's embracing
of judicial restraint is well illustrated in his criticisms of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Brown v. Board of Education and Lochner v. New
York. 10
Posner also offers criticisms, similar to those he makes of Bems, of
Robert Bork and his articulation of originalism in The Tempting of
America (pp. 237-255). To Posner, Bork fails to recognize that a "long
term contract [like the Constitution] is bound eventually to require ...
flexible interpretation, to cope effectively with altered circumstances" (pp.
244-45). Posner concludes that Bork is a pragmatist, rather than an
originalist, because he is "queasy about the consequences of originalist
rulings" (p. 245). Posner finds support for this conclusion in Bork's
assumption of the doctrine of incorporation (p. 247), acceptance of Brown
v. Board of Education, and agreement with the equal protection clause
approach of Justice John Paul Stevens (p. 250). Posner asserts that
"[o]riginalism is not an analytic method; it is a rhetoric that can be used to
support any result a judge wants to reach" (p. 251). In this way, Posner
finds Bork's legal philosophy no different from the legal philosophies of
others (including Posner) that accept "personal values" of judges in
adjudication.
Bork's originalism is not so easily characterized and dismissed. For
Bork, judges ought not make policy "not fairly to be found in the
Constitution,"'1 but rather should apply known constitutional values to
specific cases."2 Principles must be applied rather than invented, although
they must be applied to keep them relevant in a changing world. 3 Judges
should apply the principles found in a common sense reading of the text, 4
which are to be understood as the Framers intended. But if that intention
9. GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 673. For a description of Hand's broad attack on judicial
activism and consistent devotion to judicial restraint, see d. at 652-59.
10. Id at 118-23, 654-57, 661.
11. BORK, supra note 6, at 5.
12. Id. at 167, 189.
13. Id. at 168-69.
14. Id. at 5.
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is unclear or unknowable, principles should be inferred from a common
sense interpretation of the general language of the constitutional clause,
and defined at "the level of generality that interpretation of the words,
structure, and history of the Constitution fairly supports."'5
Bork's originalism thus seemingly accomplishes the goal Posner sets for
legal theory. It copes with "altered circumstances" by explicating the
applicable doctrine to changes in society 6 As Bork puts it:
There would be little need for judges... if the boundaries of every
constitutional provision were self-evident. They are not. It is the
task of the judge in this generation to discern how the framers'
values, defined in the context of the world they knew, apply to the
world we know. The world changes in which unchanging values
find their application.'
Bork's explanation gives context to his application of originalism to
constitutional law.
Posner's other problem with Bork's originalism is that it is "not
originalist enough" (p. 251). But even Posner admits that "the impurities
of Bork's originalism are a strength rather than a weakness of his book"
(p. 252). In this admission Posner has answered his second criticism of
Bork. Posner lists what he asserts are "inconsistencies" in Bork's
application of originalism to the current state of constitutional law."
Bork's strict adherence to stare decisis and its important judicial role
explain these positions. 9 But whether Posner is right or wrong about
these alleged inconsistencies, he cannot credibly dispute Bork's central
thesis that anything other than original intent jurisprudence is undemocratic
and at odds with the Framers' expressed intentions.'° The ill-defined
contours of certain constitutional provisions are, as Bork acknowledges,21
difficult to discern. That does not mean we should not try to discern them.
Bork's articulation and defense of originalism as a theory of judicial
interpretation stands unrebutted by Posner's observations of its putative
application.
Posner never addresses two points made by Berns and Bork: those
regarding the Constitution's structure and the separation of powers. He
15. Id. at 150.
16. Id. at 167.
17. Id. at 167-68. (citing Bork's opinion in Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-96 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
18. See supra p. 335.
19. See infra pp. 340-41.
20. See BORK, supra note 6, at 6.
21. Id. at 167.
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limits his attempted refutations to attacks on their minor premises, which
are insufficient to defeat originalism as an objective analytic framework,
grounded in the language and structure of the Constitution. Posner's
subjective pragmatism provides only a radical skeptical critique, one which
may have violated his own canon by elevating the conceptual over the
empirical (p. 7).
For Posner and his pragmatic approach, judges must bear in mind the
consequences of their decisions. But at their core, relevant consequences
include the systemic effects of a decision. Such effects include the debasing
of constitutional or statutory language (p. 400) and the structural concerns
of maintaining the legitimacy of our democratic structure by keeping intact
the separation of powers and the Courts' limited role within that struc-
ture.' Rather than standing with Posner as a pragmatist, Bork's articula-
tion and defense of originalism encompasses Posner's goal of considering
a decision's consequences while eliminating the vagaries and political
illegitimacies of judges applying their personal values to interpret the
Constitution. Posner's pragmatism, which in application manifests itself as
a radical skepticism, ultimately is not reconcilable with the Constitutional
role of the judiciary.
B. Economic Analysis and the Role of Judges
Overcoming Law calls insistently for an empirical approach to the law.
Posner repeatedly emphasizes scientific and empirical analysis, particularly
drawing from the field of economics, as an instrument to enhance the law
by making it more responsive to reality.
Posner is at his strongest here. His comparison of the legal profession
in its traditional form with a medieval cartel of providers of services related
to society's laws lays the groundwork for his examination of the profes-
sion's current state. Using economic theory and models, Posner gives a
cogent and enlightening explanation for the "industrialization" of legal
services, including the growth of large law firms, the intensifying competi-
tion for legal business, and the effects of these changes on the increasing
number of attorneys in this country (pp. 39-70).
Posner's empirical analysis of constitutional theory, including the
Supreme Court jurisprudence of the Warren era, exhibits the same
strengths. For Posner, constitutional interpretation can only be aided by
science: "Constitutional lawyers know little about their proper subject
matter-a complex of political, social, and economic phenomena. They
22. Id. at 6, 139-41.
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know only cases. An exclusive diet of Supreme Court opinions is a recipe
for intellectual malnutrition" (p. 208). The practical consequences of an
expansive reading of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, for example, must be considered in judging the soundness of
a decision interpreting that clause. Posner takes on and defeats left-wing
constitutional theorists who want the Supreme Court to recognize a
number of new constitutional "rights" by demonstrating how they have not
considered what the aggregate impact of such "rights"-expansion would be
on judicial workloads, the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, "or on the
distribution of power among the different branches of government" (p.
214). Posner uses the same tool of empirical analysis to dismantle a critical
legal studies' history of American legal thought (pp. 271-86), and to
educate on the forms and methods of persuasive speech in a chapter on
rhetoric, legal advocacy, and legal reasoning (pp. 498-530).
Posner's heavy emphasis on empirical analysis, however, raises the
same structural difficulties encountered by Posner's pragmatic approach to
constitutional interpretation. Posner never answers the question as to
which science is to be applied in which circumstances. Is economics always
appropriate, or, for example, are sociology and psychology to be consulted
in considering civil rights litigation? More importantly, can it be the
judiciary's role to so consult, or is it the duty of the legislature or the
administrative state-with their constitutional roles to debate and to
provide for notice and comment-to determine which science is better
applied?
One area of interest in which Posner's empirical emphasis and applica-
tion of an economic model fails to persuade is in his analysis of utility
maximization by judges (pp. 109-44). He posits a theory of judicial
behavior based on an "ordinary" federal appellate judge working for a
non-profit enterprise that has less incentive to be efficient than a profit-
maximizing provider because cost savings do not accru& as profit (p. 113).
This leads Posner to conclude that judges on average do not work as hard
as lawyers of comparable age and ability, a conclusion that Posner says
comports with his experience (p. 115).
Posner believes much judicial behavior can be explained in economic
terms (p. 123). Dividing a judge's day into two parts-time spent judging
and leisure time-Posner identifies five areas that he labels as examples of
"leisure-serving" judicial conduct:
1. "going along" voting-if not interested in a case, judges may cast
their vote with an "opinionated" judge, one who feels strongly
about a particular issue;
[Vol. 79:329
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2. theory of power without responsibility-an insistence by judges
that their decisions are "coerced by the law," and that they
should not be blamed by anyone distressed by the outcome;
3. norm of equality in assignments--"[j]udges of the same court
hear the same number of cases and ... are assigned the same
number of decisions to write"; an effort by one judge to hear
more than his proportional share of cases is resented and
rebuffed;
4. holding/dictum distinction-"[d]icta, unlike holdings, are not
considered binding in subsequent decisions"; this engenders a
"live and let live" attitude because dictum is nonbinding, and
thus a judge can join an opinion that contains much with which
he disagrees; and
5. justiciability/jurisdictional devices-invented by judges to "duck"
issues presented by parties; examples include standing, mootness,
ripeness, the political question doctrine (pp. 123-26).
Posner sees in these areas of judicial conduct a maximization of leisure
time and a reduction in time spent judging. He offers simple, formularized
models of the judicial utility function in which effort is approximated by
time and which incorporate these "leisure-serving" influences (pp. 135, 138,
& 139). Posner does so with the admonition that economics gives a
disciplined understanding of the human side of judging: decision-avoiding,
also known as maximizing leisure-seeking (p. 144).
Posner fails to consider an alternative, more compelling explanation of
judicial behavior. Although Posner's models of the judicial utility function
are valuable in their identification of some of the variables that influence
a judge's conduct, factors other than "leisure-seeking" underlie the five
influences he identifies, which are better explained as either efficiency
maximizing, in light of the huge increase in judicial workloads, or common
law doctrines to be applied for their own, well-documented reasons.
"[Fjew deny that [the federal judiciary's] appellate courts are in a 'crisis
of volume' that has transformed them from the institutions they were even
a generation ago."'  Posner himself has empirically chronicled the huge
increases in federal court filings since 1960,24 including the increase in
federal appellate filings.' The finite resources of a court system expand-
23. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE-PART 11109 (1990). Judge Posner was a member of this committee at the time
of the study.
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-73 (1985).
25. Id. at 89-93, Figures 3.1 & 3.2, at 66-67, Table 3.9, at 82, and Table 3.10, at 90.
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ing at a slower rate than the rate of case-filings has naturally resulted in
each judge being able to devote less time to each case.2 As a result, the
judge's role has been transformed from decision drafter to case-decider,
with the correlative delegation of opinion writing to law clerks (pp. 122-
23).27
Efficiency-deciding an increasing number of cases with a finite
number of resources, rather than minimizing work and maximizing
leisure-is the better explanation for "going along" voting, equality in
assignments, and the holding-dictum distinction. "Indifference" towards a
case, an opinion's author, or an opinion's dicta is a far cry from a judge as
a rational decision-maker applying limited resources to an increasing
number of cases. With less time available for each case, a judge may
decide that once satisfied with a case's result, his time spent judging must
be shifted to other cases, rather than to leisure.
"Leisure-seeking" also fails to explain the two other areas of judicial
time-allocation Posner identifies. Rather than a "cop out," adherence to
precedent, stare decisis, serves the important institutional judicial role as "a
basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted
with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurispru-
dential system that is not based upon 'an arbitrary discretion."'"
Efficiency is another reason why it is "wise judicial policy to adhere to
rules announced in earlier cases."'29
The justiciability doctrines and jurisdictional concepts Posner identifies
as tools for judges to maximize leisure are actually rooted in their own
separate rationales, many of which include an efficiency component.
Standing is a concept of constitutional magnitude derived from the "case
or controversy" requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution, and
fosters the principle of separation of powers by confining the federal courts
to performance of the traditional judicial function of resolving individual
disputes and adjudicating the rights of individuals.30 Mootness also
derives from the "case or controversy" requirement,31 and the same
26. Id. at 94-102.
27. See also id. at 102-119.
28. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888)).
29. Hubbard v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 1754, 1763 (1995) (citing B. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921)).
30. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982) (requiring that a litigant have a direct, concrete
interest in the outcome of a case).
31. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,316-20 (1974) (holding that a case could not
be adjudicated in federal court because changing circumstances had caused the case to no
[Vol. 79:329
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rationale underlies the concept of "ripeness."32 The political question
doctrine has a separation of powers rationale as well.33
Each of the areas of judging that Posner identifies as "leisure-seeking"
influences on judicial behavior are alternatively explained by the rationales
of efficiency, or as common law doctrines with constitutional underpin-
nings, some of which incorporate an efficiency component. Legal outcomes
result from a range of concerns unrelated to judges maximizing leisure
time. While creative and thought provoking, Posner's analysis of judicial
utility maximization is not compelling as a unified theory.
An irony of the primacy of empirical analysis to Posner's approach is
the criticism he has endured for his "breezy" accounts of the facts in the
federal appellate opinions he has authored for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.3 Posner's "frequent abridgement of the
facts has ... [resulted] in negative comments from his judicial col-
leagues."'35 One study asserted that "[a] very substantial number of
lawyers ... believe that Chief Judge Posner routinely ignores crucial facts
in order to reach desired conclusions," and that he "does not pay sufficient
attention to the facts."'36 The same study found that Posner criticized
attorneys' behavior without a thorough record concerning the facts.37
A concrete example in this vein is United States v. Hollingsworth,38 an
entrapment case. Posner's colleagues take him to task for allegedly
improperly abridging the facts of the case to support an introduction of a
longer have an impact on the interests of the litigants, as it would have resulted in an
impermissible advisory opinion).
32. See United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,89-91 (1947) (federal
courts may not adjudicate cases in which it is speculative whether the plaintiff will actually
suffer injury, rendering the case premature).
33. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,208-37 (1967) (certain constitutional law issues are
beyond the authority and competence of the federal judiciary to resolve; designed to avoid
confrontation between the federal judiciary and the coordinate branches of federal govern-
ment).
34. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 799 (1994) [hereinafter Evaluation]. For a
critical review of this evaluation, see Jeffrey Rosen, Washington Diarist, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Apr. 4, 1994, at 42.
35. See, e.g., Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. American Airlines, Inc., 733 F.2d 1262, 1273
(7th Cir. 1984) (Flaum, J., concurring); Original Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River
Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 283 (7th Cir. 1992) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("[t]he
majority's review of the facts here is so lopsided as to be almost droll-if it were not serious
business").
36. Evaluation, supra note 34, at 799.
37. Id. at 801.
38. 9 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1993), vacated, reh'g, en banc, granted, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
558 (Jan. 10, 1994), reh'g en banc, 27 F.3d 1196 (1994).
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new "readiness" element into the doctrine of entrapment.39  Before
Hollingsworth, faced with a colorable case of entrapment, "the government
had ... to establish that the defendant committed the elements of the
offense without having been provided an inducement by the government,
and without [having had] the idea of criminality ... implanted by the
government."'  The en banc dissent in Hollingsworth criticizes Posner's
majority opinion for recasting the facts of the case to import a constitution-
al requirement that the government must also prove "that the defendant
has sufficient aptitude ... to commit the crime, and thus poses an
immediate danger to society."41 The dissent points out the separation of
powers problems with the importation of such a criterion by a court.42
Alleged episodic failure by Posner to follow his own admonition to
ground decisions in the facts is instructive on the role of an appellate judge,
if nothing else.43 Although Posner the academic may seek and find the
data to better decide legal issues in science, Posner the judge is ultimately
constrained to review the record presented to the court as developed
below. Even a wise economist or philosopher cannot "enlarge" the factual
record. Empirical gaps in a record can tempt a decision-maker to either
"formulate" a record or ignore certain areas in reaching a desired
conclusion.
Ultimately, we cannot know whether Chief Judge Posner tends to
improperly abridge the facts in the cases before him. But the contrast
between the importance of empirical support to Posner's economic
approach to legal theory and the criticism he has received from colleagues
and attorneys for loose accounts of the facts is noteworthy. As an
explanatory and analytical tool, Posner's invocation of economics and
emphasis on empirical support for decisions is invaluable and well placed.
That same tool, however, does not necessarily accurately reflect judicial
behavior, including Posner's own.
C. Liberalism and the Law
Posner advocates reliance on political philosophy only when an
economic approach to law will not suffice (pp. 22-23). The political
39. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1205-11 (Coffey, J., dissenting); id. at 1213-17 (Ripple,
J., dissenting); see also Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d at 605 n.6 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
40. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1217 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Posner has criticized such abuse of the facts in at least one other of his books. See
R. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 55 (1990).
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philosophy he adopts is the classical liberalism of John Stuart Mill in On
Liberty: "[each] person is entitled to the maximum [personal and
economic] liberty consistent with the liberty of every other person in
society" (p. 23). Posner defends Mill from criticism by a nineteenth
century intellectual, Fitzjames Stephen.
Posner finds Stephen's critique of Mill's political theory a powerful
defense of the idea that -the law should "improve people's morals and not
just.., prevent tangible harms to third parties" (p. 262). Posner contrasts
this conception of the rule of law with Mill's conception, in which liberty
is the cornerstone of classic democracy, and that by setting tight limits on
the scope of government, people should be free to do what they want, with
the grand proviso that they refrain from doing things that interfere
unreasonably with the liberty of other people (p. 263).
Posner sides with Mill. At bottom, he frames this as a disagreement
over human nature (p. 265). Posner posits that Stephen views law as a
regulatory force (p. 266), which implies "a natural and radical inequality
among persons" (p. 267). Posner asserts that history has falsified Stephen's
political vision in two ways. First, contemporary men and women have
achieved practical equality. Second, the view that law must have a moral
and, in turn, religious basis, has been disproved by contemporary
Europeans losing their religion but not their morality, and by contemporary
Americans practicing religion without their moral state being any better
than the moral state of Europeans (p. 268). Posner finds Mill's vision of
political community more realistic (p. 268) in that it "creates the conditions
that experience teaches are necessary for personal liberty and economic
prosperity" (p. 24).
Posner never justifies importing a political philosophy different from
that of the Constitution's Framers into judicial reasoning. Nor does he
reconcile that the judiciary's constitutionally defined role presupposes a
certain type of reasoning.'M This raises the same structural problems of
the judiciary exceeding its constitutional role, not to mention the pragmatic
problems of numerous judges making difficult choices among the
multiplicity of possible political philosophies.
It is beyond the scope of this Review to delve into the shortcomings of
the Enlightenment, including that law and morality are inextricably
intertwined and that the state has a moral mission to inculcate virtue.45
44. See BORK, supra note 6, at 146-47.
45. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 51-62 (2d ed. 1984).
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But certain observations may be made about Posner's choice of Millian
liberalism.
First, Mill's utilitarianism has never clearly defined the "liberty" to
which we are all entitled and which we must respect in others. "Liberty"
is polymorphous; different definitions of it can be incommensurable, and
there are no scales of quality or quantity on which to weigh them.4 As
a concept, "liberty" can be stretched and extended in so many directions
that it becomes useless for evaluative purposes.47
Second, it is implausible to compare the personal and economic
liberties of all others to an actor's personal and economic liberty in one
single formula or conception of utility.' Even if one person's personal
and economic liberty could be defined, the idea of summing such liberties
for groups of individuals, or for some affected population, has no clear
sense.49 And if utility is not a clear concept, then its use as a rational
criterion for evaluative purposes is greatly diminished, if not extin-
guished."
Third, does utilitarianism preserve values we share as human beings?
The use of "liberty" as a criterion could often conflict with what is thought
to be a proper cause of action.5 For example, the putting to death of an
innocent man convicted of murder may, if the public believes him to be
guilty, prevent numerous innocent people from being killed by other
deterred murderers.52 Under a utilitarian view, the innocent convict
should be put to death. Allowing utility to override other existing
values-such as that a man should not be put to death for a crime he did
not commit-weakens its case as a criterion for political evaluations.53
Millian utilitarianism encounters more than just philosophical
difficulties. The history Posner cites is a less than satisfying rebuttal to
much of Stephen's world view. Many would disagree that men and women
have achieved equality. Further, general observations about the relation-
ship between religious worship and cultural mores speak only to the human
condition. Few, if any, have the synoptic historical view required to
conclude whether religion's influence upon morals, and their incorporation
46. Id. at 63-64.
47. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS 236 (1966).
48. MACINTYRE, supra note 45, at 70, 198-99.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. MACINTYRE, supra note 47, at 240.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 240-41.
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into the law, has improved the human condition. Posner's radical
skepticism again raises its head.
The theoretical weaknesses in Posner's political philosophy of choice,
however, do not necessarily result in faulty legal decisions when that
philosophy is applied. A concrete example of Posner's application of his
conception of liberty is his opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services,.' in which he directly faced the question
whether the law (here the state) existed just to prevent tangible harm to
a child, or to affirmatively act to protect the child from violence (pp. 208-
13). ' Posner's analysis of the "liberty" that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects-the negative liberty of the right to be left alone by the state,
rather than the positive liberty of entitlement to state services-evidences
a proper conception of limited government. In DeShaney, Posner follows
the well established rule "that the state's failure to protect people from
private violence, or other mishaps not attributable to the conduct of its
employees, is not a deprivation of constitutionally protected... liberty."56
Posner recognizes that the Framers' concern was with government
oppressing citizens, not "failing to provide adequate social services. '
Posner is specific in DeShaney as to the state's role: "For such failures,
political remedies... were assumed to be adequate."58 Posner concedes
that Millian liberalism is not an all encompassing philosophy of government
and law (p. 25). But Posner's decision in DeShaney demonstrates at least
some merit in that philosophy as concretely applied, if only in particular
circumstances.59
III. CONCLUSION
The "law" to be "overcome" in the book's title is the "uninformed,
formalist" tradition of law as a series of unconnected rules. The project
Posner undertakes in Overcoming Law sets him on the track to doing so
by offering a cogent treatment of the state of legal theory from economic,
philosophical, and political perspectives. His critiques of legal formalism
are often persuasive, and always well articulated.
54. 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
55. See supra p. --.
56. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 301.
57. Id.
58. Id.




Overcoming Law makes a substantial contribution to current legal
thought. Few contemporary works of legal scholarship combine the
synoptic view of social science with legal knowledge, as does this one, in
its quest to understand the law and improve its societal role.
Posner's preeminent analytical skills make the critical and constructive
aspects of Overcoming Law appealing. Gaps or inconsistencies in Posner's
treatment of certain topics usually reflect the limits of the philosophies
Posner espouses, not his analysis of the legal world considering them. But
Posner's approach does raise troubling questions about his view of the
judiciary's role in our constitutional system, as well as about the social and
political theories that he concludes should be applied in the business of
judging.
In the end, Posner's respect for the rule of law is a classic definition:
The rule of law, in the sense of a system of social control operated
in accordance with norms of disinterestedness and predictability, is
a public good of immense value. Along with a market economy
and a democratic political system, which in fact it undergirds, it is
a presupposition of modem liberalism (p. 20).
This judge's continuing drive to define a body of systematic thinking about
the rule of law through the use of three related theoretical prisms deserves
critical consideration.
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